The Coherence of Giving up Frege's Constraint: Comments on Baghramian and Coliva's *Relativism*[1]

Max Kölbel, University of Vienna

In their book *Relativism* Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva (B&C) offer a panoramic view of various forms of relativism and their history. They make a considerable effort to engage sympathetically with relativists, and to portray the motivations and advantages of the various forms of relativism they discuss. They bravely opt for an approach that attempts to articulate a common core in many views that have been thought of as forms of relativism, and this enables them to approach their subject matter in a systematic, unifying way. This is surely a good feature of the book.

However, ultimately B&C conclude that "no model … can provide a coherent account of all core claims and motivations of relativism", and they voice the suspicion that relativism may be "an incoherent concept" (p. 269).

The fact that this is the conclusion of course raises the question whether B&C's "core claims and motivations" fit the claims and motivations of actual relativists, and whether "relativism" is adequately characterized by B&C's core claims and motivations. I shall here not discuss the question of how "relativism" is best defined. But since I am one of the philosophers who figure as the target relativists in the book, I shall engage with the objections that are put forward against various substantive views of mine.

1. Abandoning a "Long-established View"

One point of substantial disagreement between myself and B&C comes out in the following remark about "truth-relativists" (amongst which they count me):

> One important weakness of their [i.e. the truth-relativists'] view is that they reject a long-established view of propositional content, that Cappelen and Hawthorne have called "The Simple View", according to which propositions bear truth and falsity as *monadic* properties (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009). (p. 68–9).

It is true that I (and many others) have proposed operating with propositional contents that do not have absolute truth-values. I shall shortly provide a sketch of such a view and what it can do. But before that it is worth clarifying two points.

First, the view I challenge is not particularly long-established or even established. When Frege introduced the technical term "thought" for the theoretical entities that were to play

the role of the content of judgments and assertions, he stipulated that they were to have absolute truth-values. But before Frege and after Frege, there are important theorists who operate with propositional contents that do not conform to Frege's constraint. The Stoics operated with propositional contents, "lekta" or things said, which did not have absolute truth values (see Recanati 2007, who appropriates the term "lekton"). In formal semantics, as it emerged in the 1960s and 70s, propositional contents were usually treated as not absolutely truth-evaluable (see e.g. Prior 1968, Lewis 1970, Kaplan 1977/89). There is also an extended debate surrounding so-called "de se phenomena", which regards precisely whether belief can be treated as a relation to propositional contents with absolute truth-values. In this debate, John Perry (1979) started out trying to preserve propositional contents with absolute truth-values. But he argued that belief merely thought of as a thinker's relation to such a propositional content was not sufficient to explain certain actions, so he additionally postulated "belief states", i.e. ways of believing propositions. Later, Perry became gradually more and more liberal with regard to the types of propositional content he allowed (e.g. Perry 1998/2012). Another example is David Lewis, who argues in "Attitudes De Dicto and De Se" (1979), that we need "centred propositions"—a species of propositional content with non-absolute truth values. Even Robert Stalnaker (2014) now argues that we need centred contents to explain some belief phenomena. Yet another example, one independent of de se phenomena, is Allan Gibbard, who develops a notion of judgment content (1990, 2003) that does not comply with Frege's constraint either. Finally, semanticist Elisabeth Coppock (2018) wants to replace world-based semantics with outlook-based semantics, the main effect of which is precisely that propositional contents do not have absolute truth-values.

The point of this long (but by no means exhaustive) list is to demonstrate that it is not an established view that propositional contents are absolutely truth-evaluable. One might argue that there was a brief period in the 1990s and early 2000s, when Frege's constraint on propositional content was treated as established orthodoxy amongst philosophers. But if so, it clearly no longer is the established view.

A second point that needs making in connection with the last quote is that it is sensible to distinguish the ordinary monadic truth-predicate (and the corresponding concept) from the truth-predicate in formal semantics (and the corresponding concept). The latter is clearly not monadic, not by anyone's lights, while the former is (see e.g. Kölbel 2008, MacFarlane 2014). It is important to mention this in order to avoid the false impression that truth-relativism involves the view that the ordinary truth-predicate is not monadic. Rather, it is a view about which theoretical entities are most suitable to play the role of propositional content in a theory of propositional attitudes and/or in a theory of linguistic content.

2. The Simple Theory

For concreteness, let me provide a brief sketch of a very simple theory that operates with propositional contents that are not absolutely truth-evaluable, and which corresponds to the

theory B&C criticize under the heading of "truth-relativism". For the record: I regard propositions as theoretical entities we use to model certain representational aspects of thought and/or language. As with all models: one model that does a good job for one purpose does not preclude another model from also doing a good job for the same or another purpose. I do not assume that if this account is useful, no other account can be useful.

The theory uses a kind of centred proposition as propositional content. Each proposition will *determine* a function from centred worlds to truth-values. A centred world is a pair of a possible world and a centre. A centre, in turn, is a pair of a thinker and a time.[2] I am saying "determines", and not "is identical to", because I want to leave open whether these centred propositions are unstructured intensions ("identical") or structured entities (merely "determines"). Thus, for each such centred content there is a unique characteristic set of centred worlds: the set containing the centred worlds at which it receives the truth-value True. For simplicity, I shall talk as if the centred contents just *are* these characteristic sets of centred worlds, i.e. that they are unstructured. All I am going to argue could be equally argued for a structured version of centred contents.

Let us say that it is correct for a thinker s to believe such a centred content at a time t and world w iff the set it determines contains the centred world $<w, <s, t>>$. With the simplification:

(C)   For all thinkers s, times t and worlds w: it is correct for s to believe a centred content C at a time t and world w iff C contains the centred world $<w, <s, t>>$.

For concreteness, let me discuss a few examples. To begin with consider the set C1 of centred worlds $<w, <s, t>>$ such that in w there is an epidemic in Vienna in 2020. Whether it is correct to believe this set depends only on the world the belief takes place in, not on who believes it or when they believe it. Thus, some centred contents meet something like the Fregean constraint: since only one world is actual, they have an absolute truth-value. (Such centred contents have been called "boring" or "portable" in the de se literature.)

When I believe that there is an epidemic in Vienna in 2020 our simple theory models that belief as having such a centred content C1. Similarly, if I say

(1)   There is an epidemic in Vienna in 2020.

our simple theory models the utterance as an assertion of that content.

Now consider the set C2 of centred worlds $<w, <s, t>>$ such that in w, Jaffa Cakes tend to cause gustatory pleasure in s at t under normal conditions.

---

[2] As Elisabeth Coppock (2018) has pointed out, using centred worlds as evaluation point presupposes a distinction between objective and non-objective factors in evaluation—possible worlds summarise these objective factors. A more purist approach would start with evaluation points such as outlooks or perspectives which are not yet factored in this way, and then worry about the factoring later.

C2 =   {<*w*, <*s*, *t*>>|in *w*, under normal conditions, Jaffa Cakes tend to cause gustatory pleasure in *s* at *t* under normal conditions}

If a thinker at a time actually tends to get gustatory pleasure from Jaffa Cakes under normal conditions, then it is correct for that thinker to believe C2 (this is a consequence of the correctness principle (C) introduced above). By contrast with C1, C2 is a centred content that violates Frege's constraint. It is non-boring or non-portable. Our simple theory models Clara's belief/judgement that Jaffa Cakes are tasty as C2. Similarly, if Clara says

(2)   Jaffa Cakes are tasty.

the simple theory models the utterance as an assertion of C2. This makes room for a situation of faultless disagreement, namely when Clara believes C2 and Mimi believes the negation (the complement set) of C2, ¬C2, i.e. Mimi believes that Jaffa Cakes are not tasty. In a situation where Clara tends to get gustatory pleasure from Jaffa Cakes, and Mimi does not, these beliefs would both be correct (see principle (C)), even though the contents believed are contradictory in the sense that there is no centred world at which both are true.

Now consider the set C3 of centred worlds <*w*, <*s*, *t*>> such that in *w* at *t* *s* is subject to a system of moral norms that prohibits reading one's children's mail without their permission.

C3 =   {<*w*, <*s*, *t*>>|in *w* at *t* *s* is subject to a system of moral norms that prohibits reading one's children's mail without their permission}

When Anna believes that it is morally wrong to read one's children's mail without their permission, the simple theory says that C3 is what she believes. When Anna says

(3)   It is morally wrong to read one's children's mail without their permission.

then according to the simple theory, Anna asserts C3. If Yujin believes ¬C3, i.e. that it is not morally wrong to read one's children's mail without their permission, then both Yujin and Anna might believe correctly, even though they believe contradictory contents—or so the simple theory predicts. All this requires is that Anna's system of norms prohibit, and Yujin's system permit, reading one's children's mail without their permission.[3]

Now consider the set C4 of centred worlds <*w*, <*s*, *t*>> such that in *w* at *t* *s* has evidence that makes it likely that Atlas III will win the race.

C4 =   {<*w*, <*s*, *t*>>|in *w* at *t* *s* has evidence that makes it likely that Atlas III will win the race}

In the simple theory, C4 models the content of a punter's belief that it is probable that Atlas III will win the race. It also treats that centred content as what the punter asserts when he says:

---

[3] The example is inspired by the work of David Wong, for example Wong 2006. The schematic idea, here exploited, that the correctness of moral beliefs may depend on the norms to which the believer "is subject", would of course need spelling out if we were defending a corresponding metaethical position. However, all we need here is the schematic idea.

(4)   It is probable that Atlas III will win the race.

If our punter has the required evidence at one time, he is correct in believing C4 at that time (principle (C)). But when he acquires new undermining evidence (e.g. knowledge of an injury), believing C4 may no longer be correct for him. His earlier belief and his later belief of the negation ¬C4, can both be correct beliefs. The punter can be quite happy with his earlier probability assignment, given that it was correct. He can say he was correct in believing C4 earlier, but that he now correctly rejects C4.

Finally consider the set C5 of centred worlds $<w, <s, t>>$ such that in w at t the evidence available to s is compatible with the solution (in a game of Master Mind[4] s is playing at t) containing a green piece.

C5 = $\{<w, <s, t>>|$ in w at t the evidence available to s is compatible with the solution containing a green piece$\}$

The simple theory says that when Mary believes that the solution might contain a green one, what she believes is C5. Similarly, what she asserts when she says

(5)   The solution (in this game of Master Mind) might contain a green piece.

is C5. Now Mary might be playing with Anjan, who has set up the solution for her. If there is no green piece in the solution, Anjan knows it. So it is incorrect for Anjan to believe C5. He in fact believes ¬C5. But Anjan knows exactly what evidence Mary has, for this is how the game works: one person sets up the solution and gives carefully regulated clues about it whenever the other person submits a guess. So Anjan himself rejects C5, but he also knows that Mary is correct in believing C5.

The simple theory is in all relevant respects like the truth-relativist theories B&C criticise in their book. Of course, this theory could be refined and improved, it could be restricted or extended. But for the moment, the simple theory will do the job of illustrating my answers to B&C's objections.

3. B&C's Objections

B&C level four major objections against relativist proposals I have made, especially in my 2002, 2003, 2004. They claim (i) that my view is not capable of capturing the sense that there is disagreement in purported cases of faultless disagreement; (ii) that it generates incorrect predictions about when people do or don't engage in disputes; (iii) that it makes false claims about competence and (iv) that it does not have the resources to explain retraction. I shall respond to each in turn.

---

[4] For the rules of this game, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mastermind_(board_game).

B&C claim that my account cannot capture the sense of disagreement that we have in purported cases of faultless disagreement. They do so by making reference to the notion of "basic disagreement" which they define as follows (following a paper by Moruzzi & Coliva):

> a basic notion of disagreement can be fleshed out by means of the following conditions:
>
> (i) *The incompatibility condition*: A and B accept incompatible contents – such as P and not-P;
>
> (ii) *The aboutness condition*: the acceptance of these contents *concerns* the same circumstances.
>
> Given Kölbel's semantics, A and B can be said to hold incompatible contents, but crucially they seem to violate the aboutness condition, for the acceptance of these contents concerns different circumstances—that is, their respective gustatory standards. (p. 78)

Response: Let's return to the Clara & Mimi example. It seems to me that when Clara believes that Jaffa Cakes are tasty and Mimi believes that they are not, they are disagreeing. The disagreement is about whether Jaffa Cakes are tasty (and *not* about anyone's gustatory responses). This is all perfectly captured by the simple theory.

Now B&C claim that a "basic disagreement" obtains only if the contents in question "concern the same circumstances". Now, I don't think when I, and many other people, say that Clara and Mimi disagree (because one believes that Jaffa Cakes are tasty and the other believes that they are not), this entails that their beliefs must concern the same circumstances. This would make the simple idea of disagreement a highly technical affair, only fully understood by those conversant with Kaplanian semantics. However, for the sake of argument I can concede that Clara and Mimi do not have a "basic disagreement" in B&C's technical sense. It is unclear why anyone should treat it as a a desideratum that Clara's and Mimi's disagreement be construed as a "basic disagreement".

In fact no reference to disagreement is needed to generate the motivation for the simple theory. It can be motivated by the simple observation that Clara seems to believe something and Mimi seems to reject what Clara believes. There seems to be a *p* such that Clara believes that *p* and Mimi believes that not-*p*. Nevertheless, none of them is committing any mistake: their beliefs are correct. The simple theory can accept that things are as they seem.

Second Objection: prediction about whether people enter disputes

The second objection claims that my theory makes false predictions about when disagreeing thinkers will enter into disputes:

> [MK's theory] predicts that they will normally engage in a certain disagreement when the matter is objective (if the question is relevant, of course), because their underlying

intuition is that someone is getting the facts wrong and the truth of the matter has to be unearthed. On the other hand, it predicts that speakers will normally not enter into any dispute when a disagreement arises on non-objective matters, because their thought will be that disagreement is not yet a sign that anyone is getting things wrong. (p. 72)

But

This claim is disputable, both when the targeted area of discourse involves expressions of taste and when it concerns morality. After all, people do engage in disputes about taste and even more so about morality and do not just pass over opposite views in silence, or even condone them. (p. 73, see also p. 79)

Response: I agree with the claim that we do engage in disputes about taste and about morality. However, I reject the claims about what my theory predicts. Basically, it is not that easy to predict under what conditions people will engage in disputes.

Suppose Shepherd Jeff believes and says that there are 30 sheep in the pen, and Shepherd Susan believes there are not (because she has counted only 28), then it may be quite important to establish whether Jeff is right. Perhaps they have 30 sheep, and if not all of them are there, they urgently need to find the missing ones before dark. It does seem to make sense for Susan to engage in dispute: to deny what Jeff has asserted, thereby preventing his assertion from updating the conversational score in the normal way. Then Jeff might answer back and say that he has just counted them twice, to justify his assertion. Or he might respond that, actually, he hasn't counted them very carefully, and propose a new count.

But even in this sort of situation, the participants might choose not to engage in dispute. Susan might judge that given Jeff's stubbornness arguing about it doesn't help, silently recount and go on a sheep-search herself, if necessary. Or Susan might think that Jeff is much more reliable than she is, and thus simply change her mind in response.

However, one thing is very unlikely to happen: Susan is not going to think that maybe Jeff's judgement is completely correct, and her own judgement as well. She is not going to think that possibly no-one has made a mistake. This is different in the case of Clara's and Mimi's disagreement. It is a possibility that Clara is right to believe that Jaffa Cakes are tasty, and that Mimi is right to believe that they are not. Of course, they could still engage in dispute—for all sorts of reasons. Clara might think that Mimi is mistaken, i.e. that Jaffa Cakes in fact do tend to cause gustatory pleasure in Mimi. So she might argue: "They are tasty, because they have chocolate on top and are really soft. You should have some.". Perhaps Clara believes that Mimi likes chocolate and soft cakes. Mimi might then answer back: "Yes, but the jelly is revolting.". That would be a kind of "serious" discussion on a matter of taste. This is not ruled out by the Simple Theory.

But they could even engage in dispute if they know that each of them is correct in their respective judgement. It might just be fun to debate this, to challenge the coherence of the others' taste judgements, or whatever. Or there might be a social component involved: Clara:

"Only sissies don't like the jelly."—Mimi: "No, the jelly tastes like pee.". There might be social pressure on having gustatory responses that are in line with the group's. This phenomenon exists not only among children: for example, acquiring a taste for real ale was a social gate-opener when I lived in Birmingham, UK.

In fact, a lot could be said about all the different purposes for which we engage in conversation and in disputes.[5] However, there remains the important contrast that I have mentioned: in shepherd Jeff's and Susan's disagreement both know that at most one of them can be right. In Clara's and Mimi's dispute, they both know that both being right is a possibility. This difference between the two kinds of disagreement will be *one* of the factors that has to be taken into account when trying to predict whether the participants will or will not engage in a dispute. A recognition of this difference is what motivates the saying "De gustibus non est disputandum".

Of course, a hard-boiled objectivist about taste might deny that there is a possibility that neither Clara nor Mimi is wrong. Then this objectivist lacks a motivation for that part of the Simple Theory. We could then move on to some of the other cases. There is also a question about whether the account of tastiness as a judge-dependent property is an empirically correct theory about the concept of tastiness people in a given group have in their repertoires, or about the meaning of "tasty" in a group. I am quite happy to concede that the simple theory is in this way open to empirical challenge. But I am not happy to concede that the simple theory predicts that people would never engage in dispute on a discretionary matter, or that they would always engage in dispute when the matter is non-discretionary.[6]

---

[5] I have myself said a few things about this, and possibly some ideas that I offered in 2002 were a little oversimplified. About conversational dynamics in general: Kölbel 2009, 2011, 2013, about exchanging views on aesthetic matters: Kölbel 2016, 2020. See also Dinges 2017a and 2017b for some well-developed views on relativistic assertion and dispute.

[6] There is an objection relating to both objections already discussed in ch. 8 of the book:

> Kölbel might reply that we could account differently for the intuition that there is a disagreement. He could maintain that, in a situation like that between John and George, there is a disagreement insofar as each party is implicitly trying to have the opponent endorse a certain moral content from their own perspective. As he says: "I might desire to get my audience to start believing some moral content" (ibid.: 309); I might predict that, if I uttered "A ought to φ", my listener might think that, given my reliability and moral competence, my perspective is worth adopting, and hence the content I am asserting is worth embracing. This would yield a picture in which each side asserts "A ought (not) to φ" in order to promote their own moral perspective.
> However, this picture too distorts what happens in actual cases of genuine moral disagreements. On this reading, the subject-matter that is really under dispute is not whether Mary ought to donate, but rather which moral perspective is better, and ought to be adopted. Non-Indexical Relativism is therefore guilty of the same fault considered in connection with the Harman-style version of relativism: it portrays moral disputes not as disputes about what is right or wrong, or about what people ought to do, but as disputes about which perspective is better and should be adopted by the parties involved in the dispute. (p. 242)

My response: there is a difference between the overt topic a dispute is about, and any further purposes one may pursue by engaging in dispute about a matter. For example, suppose I say "Billy is tall." in a situation where Billy is clearly visible (and perhaps my audience and I know that Billy is 178cm in height). We are looking for someone who can present a collection in a fashion show, and we have agreed that we need someone tall. Suppose my audience responds: "No, Billy isn't tall, Johnny is tall.", again, Johnny clearly visible in front of us (and if you want, we all know that Johnny is 186cm). Now, our dispute is overtly about Billy and Johnny and whether they are tall. But the ultimate purpose of our discussion is to negotiate our standard for tallness in this

Third Objection: knowing about competence

The next objection connects nicely with the previous one. I said that shepherds Jeff and Susan *know* that at least one of them must be wrong, and that Clara and Mimi know that there is a possibility that each of them is correct in believing what they do. How do they know? In my 2002 book, I suggested that this knowledge is part of our linguistic competence and therefore a priori. B&C's third objection is against this view:

> Equally problematic is Kölbel's idea (2002: 105) that in becoming competent communicators, we learn to tell when it is sensible to engage in some dispute, because at least one of the parties must be in error, and when it is not, because neither party is at fault. This would entail that we should know (at least implicitly and) independently of any theoretical reflection, just based on our linguistic competence, which areas of discourse are relativist and which are not. Thousands of years of discussion about these issues seem to prove otherwise. (p. 79)

Response: The objection mixes up the question of whether we will engage in dispute with the question of whether we have knowledge, on the basis of our competence, of whether there is a possibility of faultless disagreement. I have already said that people's knowledge of whether a given disagreement could be faultless does not by itself allow any prediction as to whether they will engage in dispute. It will be only one factor amongst many in generating such a prediction.

However, I do recognize the other point made here, namely that it seems overly simplified to say that we have at least implicit knowledge of which areas of discourse are discretionary, and which are not; and that we have this knowledge independently of any theoretical reflection. I agree that it can't be that simple. I do stand by my claim that shepherds Jeff and Susan, as well as children Clara and Mimi, can recognize the status of their respective disagreements without any further reflection. However, there are many other areas where this is not so clear. For example, whether people can disagree faultlessly about what is probable, is as controversial and difficult to decide as theories on the foundations of probability are. Thinking that disagreeing faultlessly about probability is possible is clearly the result of some theoretical considerations in foundations of probability. On the other hand, it seems much more plausible to me that competence involves this ability in the case of epistemic modals: competence with epistemic "might" does seem to require that one recognise that what one can correctly believe about what might be the case depends on the changing evidence one has. So, I agree with B&C's criticism of this perhaps oversimplified aspect of the account in my 2002 book.

---

context. This does not mean that our discussion is *about* what the standards for tallness should be. We could have such a discussion, but that would involve different sentences, e.g. "We should set the standard of tallness at 180cm.".

Fourth Objection: retraction

The fourth and final objection I want to discuss concerns retraction:

> By not drawing a sharp distinction between the context of use and the context of assessment, he [MK] does not seem to have the resources to explain the possibility of retraction. The latter consists in the practice of "taking back" what one said previously, upon realizing, later, that what one said was false or inaccurate. Retraction is an important feature of our assertoric practice, and yet Kölbel does not seem to have the resources to explain it. For if the context of use calls the shots, we were right when we judged, for instance, that liquorice is tasty. We may have changed our minds and think differently *now*. Yet we cannot say we were wrong *back then*, as the relevant standards remain, for Kölbel, those operative at the context of utterance. (p. 73, see also p. 78)

Response: I accept that retraction is an important feature of our assertoric practice. But I reject the claim that my account does not have the resources to explain it. In fact, I find it hard to understand the reasoning in the quote. Obviously, on the Simple Theory there can be a difference between what we can correctly believe now, and what we could correctly believe earlier. In such cases we can take back something asserted earlier but still maintain that the earlier assertion was correct. Let's look at this in an example.

When the punter receives additional undermining evidence, he retracts his earlier assertion that Atlas III will probably win. He can say, for example, "I take back what I said. It's not probable that Atlas III will win.". In this case, he has retracted by asserting the negation of what he has asserted before. But he could also retract by merely taking it back, without thereby committing himself to the negation of C4: "I take back what I said. I am not sure whether it's probable that Atlas III will win.".

There is a special aspect of retraction when non-boring centred contents are concerned (i.e. contents that one thinker might correctly believe while another correctly believes the negation). When taking back the earlier assertion, the punter can also coherently maintain that the assertion he is taking back was at the time flawless. He was right to believe C4, i.e. that Atlas III will probably win. But he can still take it back now, because with the new evidence he has acquired it is no longer correct for him to believe C4. There could be a different situation, where the punter recognizes retrospectively that he made a mistake in assessing the evidence he had when he made the original assertion. This would also be a reason for retraction. But in this case, he would also maintain that the original assertion, and the belief it gave voice to, were incorrect.

When we take back assertions on non-discretionary matters, and we know they are non-discretionary, only the second type of retraction is possible: taking back the assertion and at the same time maintaining that the original assertion (and the belief behind it) were already wrong.

I believe that this is all we need by way of an account of retraction. MacFarlane, in his 2014 book, argues that introducing contexts of assessment in addition to contexts of

utterance is required for doing justice to retraction phenomena. I have argued against this in my review of his book (Kölbel 2015).

References

Baghramian, Maria and Annalisa Coliva 2020: *Relativism*. London: Routledge.

Coppock, Elisabeth 2018: "Outlook-Based Semantics". *Linguistics and Philosophy* 41, 125–164.

Dinges, Alexander 2017a: "Relativism and Assertion", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1284248

Dinges, Alexander 2017b: "Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony". *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*

Gibbard, Allan 1990: *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*. Boston, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Gibbard, Allan 2002: *Thinking How To Live*. Oxford: OUP.

Kaplan, David 1977/89: "Demonstratives". In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), *Themes from Kaplan*, 481–563, Oxford: OUP.

Kölbel, Max 2002: *Truth Without Objectivity*. London: Routledge.

Kölbel, Max 2003: "Faultless Disagreement". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 104, 53–73.

Kölbel, Max 2004: "Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 12, pp. 297–313.

Kölbel, Max 2009 "Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion" in Sarah Sawyer (ed.), *New Waves in Philosophy of Language*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010.

Kölbel, Max 2011: "Conversational Score, Assertion and Testimony", in Herman Cappelen and Jessica Brown (eds): *Assertion: New Philosophical Essays*, Oxford: OUP, 49–77.

Kölbel, Max 2013: "The Conversational Role of Centered Contents". *Inquiry* 56, 97–121.

Kölbel, Max 2014: "Agreement and Communication". *Erkenntnis* 79 (2014), 101–120.

Kölbel, Max 2015: Review of John MacFarlane, *Assessment Sensitivity. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.*

Kölbel, Max 2016: "Aesthetic Judge-Dependence and Expertise" *Inquiry 59*, 589–617.

Kölbel, Max 2020: "The Judge-Dependence of Aesthetic and Moral Judgement", *Organon F* 27 (4) 2020, 556-587.

Lewis, David 1970: "General Semantics". *Synthese* 22, 18–67.

Lewis, David 1979b: "Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*". *Philosophical Review* 88, 513–43.

Perry, John 1979: "The Problem of the Essential Indexical". *Noûs* 13, pp. 3–21.

Perry, John 1998/2012: *Reference and Reflexivity*, 2nd revised and expanded Edition. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Recanati, François 2007: *Perspectival Thought*. Oxford: OUP.

Stalnaker, Robert 2014: *Context*. Oxford: OUP.

Wong, David 2006: *Natural Moralities*. Oxford: OUP.